Democracy Ateneo Summary 7-20-13

Compañer@s,

What follows is a brief summary of the Universidad de la Tierra Califas' Democracy Ateneo convened on Saturday, July 20, 2013 in San Jose. Seven of us gathered for our regularly scheduled reflection and action space. Immediately following a general welcome convening the space, we introduced ourselves and provided an update about current projects with a number of people sharing their work around copwatching and teacher-watching as well as active People's Investigations, pirate-radio, and youth summer-camps. Many of us are engaged in community safety, thinking through new strategies to "de-militarize" our communities, build networks between projects that counter militarized policing, address other violences produced in the community, and generate community based resources for autonomous action. Community safety efforts are even brought to bear when we take up the obligations of honoring past traditions. A current example is the organizing underway with the Chicano Moratorium in San Jose. Comrades active in the organizing effort ask how do we honor past movements in such a way to both address the motivations specific to the past and confront issues that we face in the present, including in this instance how the moratorium embodied earlier efforts in service of community safety.

During the initial introduction one comrade mentioned traveling in search of organizations promoting dry-latrines, providing us an opportunity to explore more thoroughly the politics of “taking care of our own shit.” Specifically, we examined the dry latrine as a technology that manages waste without using and depending on any water and, as a consequence, minimizes dependence on the state and market forces (see, Hesperian Health Guides: Ecological Toilets <http://en.hesperian.org/hhg/A_Community_Guide_to_Environmental_Health:Ecological_Toilets>. The mixture of feces and urine common to the flush toilet forms a toxic cocktail requiring an elaborate bureaucracy and infrastructure to remove and be treated. We noted that although there are many different approaches to managing waste, the dry latrine requires no water to maintain proper sanitation. Nor does it simply gather waste for later removal or burial. A dry latrine separates the fecal matter and the urine making it possible to redirect the urine and break down the feces into a manageable dust so that either can be used as fertilizer or discarded. Thus, carefully constructed dry latrines, when used properly, reduce the consumption of water, reduce health risks, and minimize dependence on the state. More importantly, the implementation of a dry latrine not only raises consciousness about “footprints,” but it is also a technology that initiates the process of getting “the state out of our ass.” (See, G. Esteva & M. Prakash, Grassroots Postmodernism <https://app.box.com/s/enarq8pk320j4e6l22tp>.)

After our initial go-around introducing ourselves and updating one another about relevant projects, we reviewed some of the "technologies" we deploy to insure the proper functioning of the ateneo (see, <http://ccra.mitotedigital.org/ateneo>). These technologies include our use of agreements, questions, and summaries. We spent a bit of time explaining the emergence of the ateneo as a strategy. Our review of the ateneo specifically highlighted it’s roots in earlier projects such as the Advanced Seminar in Chican@ Research in Austin, the series of mitotes in Humboldt, and the current ateneos in San Jose and San Francisco. More importantly, we analyzed each project as a critical moment essential to the emergence of Uni-Tierra Califas. We noted that the ateneo has been somewhat successful in creating an open space of reflection and action that allows us to examine some of the knowledge we possess and the theoretical reflections we have generated as we pursue locally rooted struggles.

The reflection on the dry latrine as well as the review of the technologies we deploy as part of the ateneo, i.e. agreements, questions, and summaries, sparked a quick exploration of Ivan Illich's notion of conviviality and his intervention around "tools" (see, Illich, Tools for Conviviality <https://app.box.com/s/uef2zdzzk26hudyss7r4>). Specifically, we took the occasion to recall that Illich’s theoretical approach to conviviality distinguishes between conviviality as a social process and that realized through a collective process of constructing “tools” vital for the reproduction of a community. Illich’s notion of conviviality not only emphasizes tools, but claims the examination of tools as a research strategy. Illich argues that it is possible to determine the extent of a society, community, or group's equity in making it possible for everyone in the group to realize their own needs and make a contribution to the general health of the community as a whole through a determination of its tools. Tools no longer in a community’s service, i.e. industrial tools, serve some other interests. Collectively constructing tools should make it possible for a community and each of its members to realize their desires and full potential as part of an emergent process of community renewal.

As per our agreement our primary activity for the afternoon revolved around questions (please see below). Our review of the questions we each shared raised a number of critical issues that sparked further discussion. In particular, our evaluation motivated us to ask what do people do with information that would/does outrage them? Although we all somewhat agree on the importance of accessing, circulating, and archiving information, we worried if there is a type of information or a moment of its availability that might disempower a community.

In some instances, groups may want to deploy information to instill fear in a community. Thus, documentation of certain events could further terrorize people and work in conjunction with strategies that are designed to disorient. A critical example would be the state’s use of instruments of war such as drone attacks –they are designed to both physically eliminate “enemies” and demonstrate the state's capacity to do so. Moreover, we interrogated how in some instances certain information can be used as part of a larger strategy of low intensity war (LIW). The circulation of certain information (including dis-information and mis-information) is a critical dimension of counter insurgency strategies and practices. The very logic of LIW is based on the calculated deployment of particular kinds of information –members of the community, for example, communicate the presence and impact of specific acts of violence and aid directed at the community in order to sow dissent between neighbors.

We worried that in certain situations information could undermine a community, especially in the moments where we attempt to circulate information that exposes state violence and our own organized efforts in opposition. Specifically, we investigated the possible impact if our analysis overlooks acts of resistance that in fact motivated the repressive response. In this instance, we risk only narrating the repressive actions of the state, erasing the opposition that determine the states actions. In cases where information highlights low intensity war's impact on "victims" removed from acts of resistance or strategies of survival, the circulation itself can justify a call for intervention from a higher authority. This can affirm and expand the role of the state and its institutions, including policing institutions, and as a consequence legitimize forms of liberal justice. Here is an example of where it is critical to recognize the distinction between "security" and "safety" in thinking through community safety.

The examination of the role of information in counter insurgency strategies sparked a critical discussion about race and the role of LIW strategies and tactics in U.S. racial relations. We noted in this regard, that the U.S. might be considered a perfect system of apartheid in the manner that information about the repressive apparatus is only narrowly treated as exceptional rather than a consistent structural “low intensity apartheid.” A related line of inquiry interrogated the challenges we face producing information (or analysis) that takes up the question about how crime might be “manufactured” in our communities as part of counter insurgency, LIW, or low intensity apartheid. We face multiple difficulties when organizing in our communities including responding to “criminal acts” that result in the dis-empowerment and debilitation the community.

The current interest in remembering the Chicano Moratorium raises many of the above questions. For some, the Chicano Moratorium stands as a historical moment of resistance against U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam and the overrepresentation of working class people, especially Chicanos and African Americans, in the war and among the lists of casualties. However, we also recognize that the current effort to celebrate Chicano anti-war opposition exposes an unresolved tension between those who simply want to memorialize a heroic Chicano movement moment and those who insist that our remembering of the Chicano Moratorium become an opportunity to examine current struggles to oppose America’s current military adventures, on-going wars abroad, and the counter-insurgency directed at communities at home and abroad. More importantly, we recognize a reluctance to acknowledge more recent efforts to prevent military recruitment in the schools as well as efforts to de-militarize the community, including exposing criminal and repressive state elements on the streets and in the schools. Recognizing that the celebration of the Chicano Moratorium can be a critical opportunity to advance diverse efforts to demilitarize our community and acknowledge the diverse efforts underway towards community safety, we spent a good deal of time interrogating the strategy of low intensity war in relation to the tension between mis-information strategies and our own efforts at engaging popular memory.

The interrogation of low intensity war and its service to a system of apartheid invited an acknowledgement of the Zapatistas and their on-going resistance to the low intensity war executed by four consecutive administrations since 1995. It is important to distinguish two phases of war in the case of the Zapatistas (for a useful overview of the Zapatista struggle, see Beyond Resistance <https://app.box.com/s/ci81k7faqogohuit88dh>). The first, January 1 to 12 1994 is recognized as the conventional war that ended with the initiation of dialogue between the Zapatistas and the government. The second phase of warfare, the low intensity war, began in earnest with President Ernesto Zedillo’s attack on the CCRI-CG and Subcomandnate Marcos in February 1995. In that moment of treachery, the Mexican government deployed 60,000 troops to the region initiating a campaign of military encirclement, intimidation, and counter insurgency. The government amplified the strategy by actively supporting the rise of paramilitary groups in each of the regions with a significant Zapatista presence. Many of these paramilitary forces emerged out of communities already divided by government efforts to undermine community cohesion through the use of government programs of aid and infrastructure, including housing, schools, hospitals, and agricultural implements such as tractors, seed, etc. In addition, the government has launched successive mis-information campaigns mis-representing the Zapatistas struggle through national, regional, and local media campaigns. The psychological warfare continues in the dis-information that criminalizes certain groups or “leaders” many who suffer assassination attempts and incarceration undermining the trust they have earned in their communities.

The examination of the Zapatista’s on-going struggle to resist the low intensity war directed at their communities provoked a statement about the theory of low intensity war that highlights the following components. “The principal concern of LIC doctrine,” according to Tim Dunn, “has been with countering revolution (especially in Central America during the 1980s), followed by a concern for maintaining social control in other unstable settings. Within these areas, there are three general focal points of LIC doctrine: (1) an emphasis on the internal (rather than the external) defense of a nation, (2) an emphasis on controlling targeted populations rather than territory, and (3) the assumption by the military of police-like and other unconventional, typically non-military roles, along with the adoption by the police of military characteristics.” Dunn adds that “the following specific characteristics…will serve…as a rough outline of an ideal type of low-intensity conflict: [a] military equipment and hardware associated with low-intensity conflict and antiterrorism efforts; [b] coordination, collaboration, and integration of police, intelligence, paramilitary, and, military forces and their areas of responsibility –i.e., the police acting more like military and vice versa; [c] expanded intelligence and surveillance efforts, and expanded communication systems; [d] the use of Special Operations Forces, light infantry divisions, and Marine units, as well as National Guard and reserve forces; [e] an emphasis on training efforts for local forces; [f] military and paramilitary training exercises outside of military bases; [g] increased contact by military, paramilitary, and police forces with civilians in benevolent, public-service activities; [h] psychological operations to influence political and social attitudes among civilian populations; [i] incorporation of so-called humanitarian aid –particularly that provided by private organizations—into military and police related projects; [j] various other operational characteristics of the four LIC mission areas…: foreign internal defense (counterinsurgency), antidrug operations, peacetime contingency operations, and terrorism counteraction.” (Source: Timothy Dunn, The Militarization of the US-Mexico Border, 1978-1992 (Austin: CMAS Books, 1996), p. 21; 29-30. See also, T. Dunn, “Introduction,” in The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992, <https://app.box.com/s/0jehx47gq788xhgtb4y7>.)

We examined the L.A. Rebellion as a moment of LIW. While there are many interpretations of the rebellion, including its causes and consequences, we chose to highlight the conflagration as much a result of the state’s sabotaging of the gang truce as the rage over the Rodney King verdict (see, for example, M. Davis, “Realities of the Rebellion” <https://app.box.com/s/9rxsarc75k2jf7egobog>). More to the point, the rebellion has been viewed by many as the organized opposition to the Drug War as a vehicle of LIW.

The L.A. Rebellion forced us to investigate the Prison Strike (for more information, see <http://prisonerhungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com>). We recognize the prison strike as a profound moment of organized resistance against the Drug War and the state’s strategy to eliminate cadres of young leaders, divide the community, and dissipate its resources. Our analysis also highlights the sophistication of the organizing effort by prisoners who successfully manage circulating struggle both “inside and outside” while breaking through racial boundaries in order to call for an end to the use of Secure Housing Units (SHU) and the “debrief.” We asked how the strike connected to our organizing work, why it poses such a profound threat to the state, and how do we imagine it as one of many fronts of struggle? We examined the successful strategy of those inside in making visible the conditions of the SHU as a deliberate effort by the state. The profound act of resistance by self-determined prisoners anticipates and interrupts the circulation of information designed to terrorize. Thus, not only does it reveal the SHU as an unnecessary component in managing crime or maintaining order, but also exposes it as a mechanism of low intensity war.

We concluded our conversation with an interrogation of cognitive capitalism and the challenges we face analyzing capital in the “information age.” Specifically, we examined the question of value and how we might be imbricated in its production through our use of technological devices. We also recognize how these devices can have strategic use-value in circulating information, making our organizing efforts more efficient, and facilitating the convening of community. More importantly, we distinguished between information and education as opposed to knowledge and learning. In other words, we recognize that information, much like education, can often be a site or “tools” of commodification whereas knowledge and learning are the result of our collective efforts to advance our struggles. The privatization of knowledge becomes a critical site of command and capture for capital.

Questions

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1. How can we communicate across regions? Stay connected? Share information?

2. How do we assess our efforts with community, without falling into conscientizing folks? (Why aren't you copwatching?! v. Actually copwatching or disrupting check points).

3. What is the role of the caciques in the Non-Profit Industrial Complex? How do we manage caciquismo in the current era and with the new racial regime?

4. What do we do beyond "outrage"? How does/do our investigations/reports engage/serve people? How do we use the information we archive beyond consciousness raising or outrage?

5. How do we manage "community safety" confronting violence from within the community?

6. How to confront "toxic" elements of the "Left" and engage folks who are struggling?

7. How do "we" see the "political"?

8. How do we disentangle repression of Black and Brown communities from "crime prevention" and "democracy" as strategies of settler colonial societies?

9. How is the political being commodified?

10. How is "crime" manufactured as a strategy of Low Intensity War and how do we confront that process?

11. How do we de-privatize our struggle as we refuse caciquismo and recognize structural violence(s)?

12. What is the role of the university in the privatization of struggle?