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## *Policy archaeology: a new policy studies methodology*

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Policy archaeology is a radically different approach to policy studies in education, drawn from the post-structuralist work of Foucault, which completely reconceptualizes policy studies and, thus, significantly expands it as a critical problematic. Rather than beginning after social and education problems have emerged into social visibility, policy archaeology studies the social construction of these problems. Rather than acquiescing to the range of policy solutions debated by policy makers and policy analysts, it interrogates the social construction of that range. Rather than accepting policy studies as a 'neutral' social science, it questions the broader social functions of policy studies. And, finally, rather than concluding that social and education problems, policy solutions and policy studies are created by the conscious interplay of the free agents of history, policy archaeology proposes that a grid of social regularities constitutes what is seen as a problem, what is socially legitimized as a policy solution, and what policy studies itself is.

But, then, what is philosophy today - philosophical activity, I mean - if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavour to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known. (Foucault 1985: 9)

Although new issues or questions continue to emerge on a regular basis within policy studies, the territory or problematic that policy studies and its attendant research methodologies encompass has become relatively well defined. Even the more recent emergence of interpretivist or postpositivist approaches to policy studies and the efforts to develop methodologies that are congruent with these newer epistemologies (e.g. Hawkesworth 1988, Kelly and Maynard-Moody 1993) do not, for the most part, change the boundaries and borders of that defined territory. In contrast, what I propose here is a radically different approach to policy studies, one that opens up an entirely new territory, one that establishes a new problematic, and, thus, one that substantially alters and expands the policy studies arena. In addition, this new problematic critically interrogates both conventional policy studies and the new interpretivist-postpositivist approaches within the present historical moment. I call this new approach 'policy archaeology'.

Policy archaeology is drawn from my interactions with the early works of Foucault (1972, 1973, 1979, 1988) and with three of his articles that were published in 1991 (1991a-c).<sup>1</sup> The emphasis, however, should be on 'my interactions' rather than on 'Foucault'. I do not pretend to have correctly 'interpreted' Foucault, but it is from my repeated readings of these works that I developed this new way of thinking about social and education policies and the social and education problems<sup>2</sup> that the policies are meant to solve or alleviate. In addition, while I openly acknowledge my significant debt to Foucault, I do not want to be captured by his work; I do not want to be held in thrall, as I have sometimes been, by the formidable power of his social theory.

In the first section of this article, I will critique conventional and interpretivist-postpositivist orientations (hereafter referred to as 'postpositivist' only) to policy studies and

lay out the four arenas of study for this new policy studies methodology. In the following section, I will provide a short discussion on how this method could be applied to an education policy that is currently receiving considerable attention in the USA, the linkage of school, health and social services (the subject of a 1993 Special Issue of this journal). In the final section, I will make some concluding remarks about this new methodology. This article, however, is not an attempt to explicate policy archaeology fully; such an effort would require more space than is possible here. Instead it is but an initial discussion of policy archaeology.

## Policy archaeology

### *Traditional and postpositivist policy studies*

Both traditional policy researchers and those who use the newer postpositivist approaches<sup>3</sup> assume that a social problem, for which a policy solution is needed, is like a disease. While there may be, in their view, *a priori* conditions (like poverty or dysfunctional families) that can be said to be the 'cause' of the disease (the social problem), at some point the disease requires either a real (the conventional approach) or a symbolic (the postpositivist approach) treatment, i.e. a policy solution. In a critical sense, the emergence of the disease (social problem) is seen as 'natural' and 'real' (an empirical given), much like the natural emergence of the symptoms of a disease. While these policy researchers may think that in the best of all possible worlds society would not produce such problems, they see nothing unnatural or socially constructed about what comes to be labelled or identified as a social problem.

Given this traditional policy studies problematic, policy studies typically encompass one or more of four areas: (1) descriptions of social problems, (2) discussions of competing policy solutions, (3) considerations of general implementation problems, and (4) evaluations of particular policy implementations. For example, Cornbleth and Waugh (1993: 31), in their characterization of policy studies, largely verify the four areas I have described above. Within the first of these four areas of policy studies, traditional policy researchers compile descriptions of social problems and discuss probable causes for the problems. For example, policy researchers might report on the demographic and attitudinal characteristics of students failing in school for the purpose of indicating some of the dimensions or 'causes' of the problem of failing students. Within the second area of traditional policy studies, policy researchers discuss the relative merits of different policy solutions. For example, policy researchers might compare the merits of intervening solely with the failing students with the merits of intervening with both the students and their families.

Within the third area, policy researchers study policies that have already been implemented in order to consider possible problems in implementation. For example, it may be found that an intervention with both failing students and their families may be difficult to arrange given the lack of availability of the family members, but this may not be apparent until the intervention is actually undertaken. Within the fourth area, policy researchers evaluate the effectiveness of the policy implementation. For example, policy researchers might evaluate whether or not a programme intervening with both failing students and their families actually decreases the failure rate of such students.

Postpositivist policy researchers argue that they approach policy studies differently. For example, Kelly and Maynard-Moody (1993) contend that in contrast with the

conventional approach (which they call the 'positivist' approach), postpositivist approaches 'now conceive of policies as symbolic and interpretive rather than as efficient solutions designed to solve society's ills' (p. 135). They see 'the policy process . . . as a struggle over symbols . . . [, and] policies themselves are now considered as largely symbolic, a way to give voice to latent public concerns' (p. 135). Thus, policy solutions are no longer 'real' solutions or efforts to solve social or education problems; policies are now symbolic solutions to 'latent public concerns'. None the less, there is no effort within this newer orientation to question or critique the 'natural' emergence of social problems. In fact, Kelly and Maynard-Moody (1993) use the same medical metaphor that suffices the conventional characterization of policy studies when they label social problems as 'society's ills'. They are, consequently, accepting the same empirically given status of social problems that the conventional approach accepts; the postpositivist deviation from the conventional approach is that policy activities are primarily symbolic performances rather than efforts at developing rational solutions to social problems.

That the new postpositivist orientation actually deviates little from the traditional one is even more evident in Hawkesworth's (1988) respected 'post-positivist' work, *Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis*. She contends that:

. . . post-positivist policy analysis derives its justificatory force from its capacity to illuminate the contentious dimensions of policy questions, to explain the intractability of policy debates, to demonstrate the deficiencies of alternative policy proposals, to identify the defects of supporting arguments, and to elucidate the political implications of contending prescriptions. (p. 191)

These capacities are not different from those claimed by traditional (positivist) policy analysts; in fact, I fail to see any difference whatsoever between this postpositivist description of the problematic of policy studies and a positivist description.

While traditional and postpositivist policy analysts, at least, claim to conceptualize policy studies differently, they both accept or presume a commitment to the larger liberal world-view in which they exist. In that world-view, modern (or postmodern) free-enterprise democracies are the best, though not perfect, societies. Within the conventional approach, policy studies as a problematic, as an arena of inquiry, arises within liberal democratic societies for the purpose of improving the social order – analysing and understanding its problems and discovering and devising the best solutions or, at least, ameliorizations. Policy analysts of the conventional orientation see themselves as potentially important contributors to the improvement of education and society. Within the postpositivist approach, policy studies as a problematic arises in order to symbolize 'latent public concerns' for the implicit purpose of maintaining or restabilizing the social order that might have eventually been threatened if the 'latent concerns' were not given voice through policies. Therefore, policy analysts of the postpositivist orientation also see themselves as potentially important contributors to the maintenance of education and society. Traditional policy studies, like medical studies, are the study of social diseases (social problems) for the purpose of curing the patient (the social body) or, at least, controlling the disease so the larger social body is preserved; postpositivist policy studies perform a similar function except that they focus on the level of a symbolic performance. The question of whether substantial social problems are an indication that the liberal social order itself should be questioned is not typically addressed within either traditional or postpositivist approaches. Policy archaeology, however, takes a radically different approach to policy studies in virtually all its aspects, including definitions of problems and problem groups, discussions of policies and policy alternatives, and presumptions about the function of policy studies within the larger social order.

*Policy archaeology*

I divide this new policy studies methodology into four arenas of study or focus:

- Arena I. The education/social problem arena: the study of the social construction of specific education and social problems.
- Arena II. The social regularities arena: the identification of the network of social regularities across education and social problems.
- Arena III. The policy solution arena: the study of the social construction of the range of acceptable policy solutions.
- Arena IV. The policy studies arena: the study of the social functions of policy studies itself.

The first arena of policy archaeology, instead of accepting a social problem as an empirical given, questions or brackets this givenness. Paraphrasing Foucault (1972), '[t]he tranquility with which ... [social problems] are accepted must be disturbed' (p. 25).<sup>4</sup> Policy archaeology, refusing the acceptance of social problems as natural occurrences, examines closely and sceptically the emergence of the particular problem. By what process did a particular problem emerge, or, better, how did a particular problem come to be seen as a problem? What makes the emergence of a particular problem possible? Why do some 'problems' become identified as social problems while other 'problems' do not achieve that level of identification? By what process does a social problem gain the 'gaze' of the state, of the society and, thus, emerge from a kind of social invisibility into visibility? As Foucault (1972) said, 'how is it that one particular [discursive] statement [i.e. social problem] at the time it appeared' (p. 179). Policy archaeology posits that social problems are social constructions,<sup>5</sup> and it critically examines the social construction process – how the social problem was made 'manifest, nameable, and describable' (Foucault 1972: 41). Consequently, the territory of policy archaeology, contrary to that of traditional and post-positivist approaches, begins prior to the emergence and social identification of a 'problem' as a problem (though there must be a social identification of the problem before its antecedents may be studied). Policy archaeology studies the numerous, complex strands and traces of social problems prior to their naming as social problems. It examines the naming process, the process by which problems enter the gaze of the state and policy researchers. It critically probes why and how these strands and traces congeal (become visible) into what is thereafter labelled as a particular social problem.

But policy archaeology is not the study of the history of the emergence of a social problem. Archaeology is what Mahon (1992) has called the investigation of 'the historical a priori' (p. 60).<sup>6</sup> As Foucault (1989) said, 'I first used the word [archaeology] ... in order to designate a form of analysis that wouldn't at all be a history (in the sense that one recounts the history of inventions or of ideas)' (p. 45). Foucault's comment does not mean, however, that historical artifacts or events are not part of policy archaeology as a method. One of the prominent features of Foucault's archaeology has been the retrieval and presentation of previously ignored but provocative historical documents that he then used as 'evidence' in the arguments he made. But the history of a particular social problem is not the focus of policy archaeology. Instead, the focus is to investigate the intersection or, better, the constitutive grid of conditions, assumptions, forces which make the emergence of a social problem, and its strands and traces, possible – to investigate how a social problem becomes visible as a social problem. Policy archaeology, according to my adaptation of Foucault, investigates:

... the conditions necessary for the appearance of a ... [social problem], the historical conditions required if one is to 'say anything' about it, the conditions necessary if it [the social problem] is to exist in relation to other objects ... (Foucault 1972: 44)

Consequently, a social problem:

... does not wait in limbo the order that will free it and enable it to become embodied in a visible and prolix objectivity; it does not pre-exist itself, held back by some obstacle at the first edge of light. It [a social problem] exists under the positive conditions of a complex group of relations. (1972: 45)

Policy archaeology 'tries to establish the rules of formation [of social problems and policy choices, in this case], in order to define the conditions of their realization' (Foucault 1972: 207). Policy archaeology tries to describe the 'complex group of relations' that make social problems and policy choices possible.

This, then, is the second major arena of policy archaeology: policy archaeology suggests that there are powerful 'grids' or networks of regularities (a kind of grammar or economy similar to Foucault's 'complex group of relations') that are constitutive of the emergence or social construction of a particular problem as a social problem, regularities that constitute what is labelled as a problem and what is not labelled as a problem. These grids, also, constitute the range of acceptable policy choices. This second arena of policy archaeology, however, is a complex one. It is based on the assumption that social problems do not achieve their visibility or recognition or status as social problems in an idiosyncratic or random or 'natural' fashion, but that visibility is not primarily a function of the interactive intentions and actions of consciously involved social agents or groups. Nor is the range of policies that get considered to 'solve' a social problem primarily the function of the same intentions and actions. Instead, policy archaeology suggests that there is a grid of social regularities that constitutes what becomes socially visible as a social problem and what becomes socially visible as a range of credible policy solutions. Policy archaeology as a methodology proposes that it can identify this grid or network of social regularities.

Understanding what I mean by 'social regularities', then, is critical to understanding policy archaeology as a methodology. Foucault (1973) asserted that:

... unknown to themselves, naturalists, economists, and grammarians [of the Classical age] employed the same rules to define the objects proper to their own study, to form their concepts, to build their theories. It is these rules of formation which were never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called, somewhat arbitrarily, *archaeological* [emphasis added] ... I have tried to determine the basis or *archaeological system* [emphasis added] common to a whole series of scientific 'representations' or 'products' dispersed throughout the natural history, economics, and philosophy of the Classical period. (pp. xi–xii)

According to Foucault, scientists of various sorts define their objects, form their concepts, build their theories in seemingly different fields unconsciously using the same 'rules of formation', and he proposed that archaeology as a method could identify these 'rules of formation'. Similarly, I am arguing that widely different social and education problems and policy solutions are, in fact, constituted by the same grid of social regularities and that policy archaeology can identify these regularities. It is, therefore, the identification of these regularities that is the second arena of policy archaeology.

Four additional points need to be made about these regularities. (I am, thus, making four points about the second arena of policy archaeology). The first point about the second arena of policy archaeology is that the regularities are not intentional; that is, no particular individual or group consciously created them. This does not mean, however, that no individual or group may not benefit from the regularities. Just as no individual or group has conscious control of the creation of the discursive regularities that provided the basis

for the emergence of the human sciences (Foucault 1972), no individual or group has conscious control of the creation of the social regularities that policy archaeology seeks to identify. Social regularities are positively<sup>7</sup> productive and reproductive without the need for conscious or intentional agency or a fully self-aware subjectivity that controls or manages those productive and reproductive processes; social orders are continuously re-established or reproduced by the network of social regularities without the need for a controlling agency. In fact, as Foucault and other postmodernists have pointed out, agency or subjectivity, 'the already "encoded" eye' (Foucault 1973: xxi) is itself but another of the inscriptions or productions/reproductions of the implicate social order. 'It must now be recognized that it is neither by recourse to a transcendental subject nor by recourse to a psychological subjectivity that . . . [social regularities, in this case] should be defined' (Foucault 1972: 55).<sup>8</sup> Daily human micro-practices (at home, at work, at play) are, thus, instantiations of these social regularities, but the 'sovereignty of the subject' of the liberal social order is rejected. For the policy maker or policy analyst, for example, these social regularities exist as a kind of a 'positivist unconscious . . . a level [within the individual but shared across individuals] that eludes the consciousness of the scientist [policy maker and policy analyst] and yet is part of the scientific [or policy] discourse' (Foucault 1973: xi).<sup>9</sup> Social regularities, then, constitute both categories of thought and ways of thinking.

The second point about the second arena of policy archaeology is that social regularities do not determine social problems or policy solutions as if from the outside or as if the regularities are an outside force; instead 'they constitute rather the set of conditions in accordance with which a practice is exercised [with which a social problem emerges]' (Foucault 1972: 208). Social regularities are constitutive of social problems and of policy solutions. One reason such regularities are not a kind of deterministic mechanism is that social systems are incredibly complex with uncountable macro- and micro-interactions occurring on an hourly basis. Weather prediction is a somewhat useful example. The interactions are so complex over such a large territory that only overall tendencies and very short-term forecasts are possible. But I would suggest that human societies with their physical, social and psychological interactions make planet-sized weather systems look fairly simple. Complex social systems can virtually never be totalized under any kind of regimen; in fact, difference, as many poststructuralists have argued, is inherent in any unity. Another reason that this account of social regularities does not establish a determinism is that while these regularities are constitutive of dominant categories of thought and ways of thinking, other categories of thought and ways of thinking do exist. The latter, however, which are typically produced in communities of difference and marginalization of various sorts, do not achieve prominent social visibility. For example, critical race theorists or feminists often hold views of the social order in the USA that are very different from those views held by governmental agents and professionals, but the former views do not typically achieve the social credibility of the views of the latter. Policy archaeology suggests that social regularities are 'productive' and 'reproductive' in the sense that the regularities constitute what is socially visible or credible, but the regularities do not literally create material reality. Instead they constitute what is socially selected and verified as 'real'. In the case of social problems and policy solutions, the network of regularities constitutes what is socially legitimized (constructed) as a social problem and what is socially legitimized as the proper range of policy solutions.

The third point about these regularities is that they are historical. Regularities change and disappear, and new ones emerge. Just as Foucault (1979, 1988) has delineated shifts in the epistemic level within western history (as with madness or crime and punishment),

policy archaeology posits that it can not only identify the regularities but also delineate shifts in such regularities that shape the emergence of social problems and policy solutions. In other words, this poststructuralist approach, unlike structuralist approaches, assumes that the regularities (what the structuralists would call 'deep structures'; White 1978: 231) that are being identified are not the same throughout all time or all societies. All social regularities are particular to particular time periods within individual societies. Historical shifts may lead to shifts in the grid of regularities that shape the emergence or visibility of particular social problems and policy solutions. In addition, policy archaeology, as a method for identifying social regularities, is itself emergent within a particular historical period; consequently, historical changes may lead to the decline and disappearance of policy archaeology as a relevant methodology.<sup>10</sup> However, particular social regularities need not change or disappear with the rise and fall of identified periods within a particular society or civilization. For example, male supremacy is one social regularity that has remained, though in different forms, throughout the entire history of western civilization. The mutation of the particular forms of male supremacy, though, is of crucial importance: for instance, male supremacy prior to the emergence of the capitalist class structure is, in many ways, both similar to and different from current forms of male supremacy.

The fourth point about the second arena of policy archaeology is that a post-structuralist approach moves against, though not entirely against, the distorting structuralist metaphor of 'depth' or 'deep structure'.<sup>11</sup> The structuralists – such as Marx, Freud and Lévi-Strauss – have employed, implicitly or explicitly, a metaphor of architectural structures. The structuralists posited deep structures that were opposed to the superficial or the surface. The reason that this metaphor is distortive for the post-structuralist is that 'deep structural phenomena' and 'surface phenomena' both occur at the level of daily human micro-practices. As Foucault has said, all is surface, meaning not that everything is superficial but that everything happens at the surface, i.e. within the context of human activity. Thus, archaeology '[i]nstead of outlining a horizon that rises from the depths of history and maintains itself through history . . . is . . . at the most "superficial" level' (Foucault 1972: 62). Again, however, the contention that everything happens at the 'surface', within human actions, does not require the assumption that these social agents are self-consciously aware of the social regularities shaping their subjectivities and their practices. Typically, social agents are not aware in this fashion.

*The third arena of policy archaeology* is the study of how the range of possible policy choices is shaped by the grid of social regularities. Just as social problems are constituted by the grid of regularities, the range of acceptable policy solutions is similarly constituted. But again this shaping is not an intentional or conscious activity. The conscious activity of policy analysts or policy makers, for example, is not the issue. The grid of regularities is like a preconceptual field that constitutes some policy choices as relevant and others as virtually invisible; it privileges some choices over others. This arena, then, is the study of how the grid of social regularities generates the range of possible and 'impossible' policy solutions.

*The fourth arena of policy archaeology* is the examination of the function of conventional and postpositivist policy studies within the larger liberal social order.<sup>12</sup> Policy archaeology suggests that conventional and postpositivist policy studies themselves are, like social problems and policy solutions, constituted by social regularities. If this is so, then it is important to query what this function is, how it occurs, and what its effects are. For example, this kind of study might begin with questions like: why have both conventional and postpositivist policy studies not questioned or examined the social problem emergence issue? Why have both approaches not studied the constructedness of social problems?

Eventually, however, the study should lead to larger and more fundamental questions about the social-order function of conventional and postpositivist policy studies.

It should be understood, however, even though I have divided policy archaeology into four separate arenas, all of which have permeable boundaries, that the policy archaeology process is recursive or iterative; work on a particular problem-policy axis repeatedly passes through all four arenas and, thus, work in any one arena may refashion or alter what has already been done in another arena. The 'end point' of the research occurs when the research effort is no longer producing any material that significantly refashions or alters any of the four arenas. Also, the (I-IV) order that I have given the four arenas is not meant to imply that this is the order in which a policy archaeologist should proceed; any ordering is possible. In fact, in the next section I start my application of policy archaeology to a specific education problem-policy solution axis with the second arena.

I now turn to a brief discussion of how policy archaeology might be applied to an education problem, the school failure of urban children, and a policy solution, the linkage of school, health and social services (or 'school-linked children's services', Kirst 1992), that is currently receiving much attention in policy studies circles in the USA and elsewhere (see, for example, *The 1993 Politics of Education Association Yearbook*, reprinted in this journal, 1993). I will not, however, present a fully developed policy archaeology of this problem-policy axis because of space limitations; such a presentation will await a later publication.

### Policy archaeology applied

As attention to previously ignored groups of students, groups such as children of colour, and attention to the generally negative conditions within which a significant proportion of US children live has grown, efforts to assist these children in order to increase their chances of success in school have coalesced around the idea that linking or integrating social, health and school services which are already provided by many different governmental agencies is a reasonably good policy measure. In this particular case, while the policy solution - linked or co-ordinated children's services - is fairly straightforward conceptually, the problem that this policy is meant to address is messy, complex and large. The descriptive litany is formidable: poverty, lack of health care, single-parent families, homelessness, and child abuse and neglect (see, for example, Adler 1993: 9-10, Capper and Hammiller 1993: 2, Crowson and Boyd 1993: 144, Dryfoos 1991: 121-123, Kirst 1992: 300-302, Koppich 1993: 52-53, Mawhinney 1993: 34, amongst many others). Koppich (1993) concluded that 'plenty [of US children] face desperate existences' (p. 52), that '[m]any [children] are . . . poor or in fragile health or lacking sufficient family support, [and that] [c]hildren's problems often are severe' (p. 53). What brings all of this to the schoolhouse door, however, is the failure in school of those with these life circumstances.

While I cannot at this point delineate all of the regularities which shape the social construction of this particular problem and this particular policy solution, I will suggest what some of those regularities (the second arena of policy archaeology) are, discuss how they shape the social construction of the problem - the failure of a particular group of schoolchildren (the first arena of policy archaeology), examine how these regularities constitute the range of policy solutions (the third arena), and address what the function of conventional and postpositivist policy studies is in relation to this particular problem-policy axis (the fourth arena). As I mentioned previously, I will apply each of the

four arenas of policy archaeology to the problem-policy axis of linked school services, but I will do so in the following order: II, I, II and, finally, IV.

### *Policy archaeology applied: Arena II*

I would posit that there are five regularities (amongst others) that are necessary to the constitution or emergence or construction of the problem of failing school children. These are gender, race, class, governmentality and professionalization. The complex grid-like intersection of these five regularities (and others as yet unidentified) makes it possible for this particular problem to emerge as a problem, constructs this problem, constitutes the problem as an 'object' of social visibility. But it is not sufficient simply to identify the regularities. While certain features of these particular regularities are readily visible to social agents, the positive proliferation of these regularities throughout social forms and practices is often not easily visible. While there is not space here for an extended discussion of all five of the regularities I have named, I will discuss race as a regularity, especially in terms of its 'invisibility' at the surface of human actions, and then briefly touch on the other four.

Racial differentiation is an old regularity in western civilization, having assumed many different forms over different historical periods. But to label this regularity as 'race' or 'racial differentiation' is inadequate. The more appropriate label is 'white supremacy'.<sup>13</sup> The West in general and the USA in particular have a long history of white racial dominance. Today, however, in the USA it is frequently thought that white supremacy largely resides in the past, and it is certainly true that social struggles have made illegal many white supremacist practices that were once accepted as 'natural' by most whites. During this earlier historical period, white supremacist beliefs and acts were socially 'invisible' (as racist beliefs and acts) to whites, and, now, many of these same beliefs and acts are socially 'visible' to whites as racist beliefs and acts. While these new visibilities are a valuable result of civil rights struggles, they leave much of the propagation of white supremacy, as a social regularity, unmarked or unseen. Social regularities are positively reproduced through the production of social life forms and practices. These regularities themselves, however, are not necessarily visible to social agents even though they exist at the surface of human practices. One example will illustrate this.

In an article entitled 'Whiteness as property', Harris (1993) persuasively argues that, to a significant extent, US definitions of property arose historically in relation to the legal enshrinement of African-Americans as property and to the seizure of Native American lands. She cites numerous key legal cases in which the definition of property is 'contingent on, intertwined with, and conflated with race' (p. 1714) with the result being the legalization (legitimation) of the domination of African-Americans and Native Americans by whites, i.e. white supremacy. Indeed, she argues that 'whiteness' was a central concept that was used in the legal construction of the definition of property. In contrast, however, with arguments that the cited legal cases are of the dead past, Harris contends that '[a]fter legalized segregation was overturned, whiteness as property evolved into a more modern form through the law's ratification of the settled expectations of relative white privilege as a legitimate and natural baseline' (p. 1714). She asserts that this 'more modern form' re-institutes racial subordination:

... through modern conceptions of race and identity embraced in law. Whiteness as property has taken on more subtle forms, but retains its core characteristic - the legal legitimation of expectations of power and control that enshrine the [white dominant] status quo as a neutral baseline, while masking the maintenance of white privilege

and domination . . . [including] as the unspoken center of current polarities around the issue of affirmative action. (Harris 1993: 1714-1715)

In short, property as whiteness has changed its form, but its 'core characteristic', white supremacy, is retained.

I suggest that this example illustrates how social regularities evolve and proliferate but still retain their 'core characteristic'. The grid of fundamental social regularities is the field necessary to the constitution of the forms or practices or 'objects' of social life, and these forms, in turn, reproduce the social regularities. The social regularities are like preconceptual glasses or frames through which human actions and categories, including social problems and policy solutions, become socially defined. While in the present or during some period of the past a particular regularity may be reinforced by conscious or intended human actions, regularities, operating like powerfully embedded preconceptual frames, generate throughout social forms in ways that are not necessarily visible to social agents. What Stanfield (1993a, b) identifies as white ethnocentric modes of thinking about social life and categories of thought are privileged as common-sense or natural or the best or are just assumed. In contrast, Native American conceptions of property, for example, disappear or, better, never appear within dominant social discourses because they are incongruent with the dominant social order. The invisibility of these alternative conceptions belies their continued presence as socially invisible parameters of socially visible, acceptable definitions of property. Such alternative definitions may not be socially seen, but they continue to be embedded in legal and popular definitions of property.

In an important sense, social regularities are constitutive both epistemologically and ontologically. They constitute our frames of knowing (epistemologies) and our 'nature of reality' categories (ontologies). What Foucault (1972) says about discourse can similarly be said about social regularities: social regularities 'do not identify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of doing so conceal their own invention' (p. 49) because the social order would be delegitimized if it were readily apparent that inequalities, for instance, were merely historical social constructions or that supposedly dead regularities like white supremacy continued to multiply generatively throughout the social order, including through the emergence and identification of social problems, problem groups and policy solutions.

Gender and class, as regularities, operate similarly to race (though of course there are important differences) so I will not use any space here to discuss them or their complex interactions. Governmentality and professionalization, the other two regularities I have identified, are not so accessible. Governmentality is a word that Foucault (1991a) used to denote the emergence of a kind of governance mentality that expands its reach into all aspects of the lives of its citizens; it is the kind of governance that counts, describes, defines, that brings everything under its gaze (a Panopticon-type of governmentality), whereas in past times, according to Foucault, government had little concern for most aspects of the lives of its citizenry. As Gordon (1991) said:

Computerization and administrative rationality begin to make possible for the first time [though, for Foucault, this mentality emerges prior to computers and coextensive with the emergence of the social sciences] a 'real' government of population which, by co-ordinating appropriate forms of expertise and assessment, is capable of identifying all those individual members of society who can be deemed, by manifesting some combination of a specified range of 'factors', to present a significant, albeit involuntary, risk to themselves or to the community [i.e. problem groups]. (p. 45)

Governmentality is a kind of governmental rationality that equates the well-being or happiness or productiveness of individuals with behaviours that reinforce the social order. It is an insatiable management of social spaces, social practices and forms. It is like a

monster, without a conscious master, a headless monster, that must consume everything, that must bring all social reality within its taxonomical or descriptive regime, that 'must bring under management those zones of social life which have hitherto remained formless' (Procacci 1991: 164). Though individual governmental agents apply this mentality to their areas of responsibility, they typically are not conscious that they are proliferating a social regularity. Their individual actions are commonsensical given the grid of social regularities that is constituting social life. These individual agents do not have bad intentions; they are, instead, inscribed by and, in turn, inscribing governmentality. (Policy making and policy analysis are, of course, an integral part of this regime, but that will be discussed as part of Arena IV.)

Professionalization works closely in tandem with governmentality. Professionalization is the proliferation of professions to treat and manage the citizenry, i.e. produce the disciplined, productive citizen, though, again, the larger implications of this goal are not evident to professionals themselves. Professionals, like government agents, typically operate with the best of intentions; indeed, good intentions are typically one facet of their professional socialization. Consequently, while professionals function within a mindset that legitimizes the need for and positive value of their therapeutic or transformational or management theories, the theories are instantiations of ideologies, the regulational purpose of which is to fashion productive citizens according to the norms of the current social order, i.e. to normalize citizens. Just as sanity is a socially functional category constituted so as to be congruent with a particular historical period, as Foucault (1988) has argued, theories of management, schooling and policy are the same. They accord with the regularities that constitute them. 'Appropriate' management of schools becomes that management which produces social-order-congruent citizens, i.e. productive<sup>14</sup> citizens. 'Appropriate' student behaviour is that behaviour that is obedient to or congruent with current conceptions of productive citizenry. Just as citizens are taught what sanity is by the marking, defining, excluding and confining of the 'insane', productive students are disciplined not through the marking, defining, excluding and confining of their bodies but by the public application of these processes to the bodies of unproductive students. Productive citizens continually re-learn 'right behaviour' by the public display of 'wrong behaviour', especially through the social process of identifying social problems, problem groups and policy solutions.

These five – race, gender, class, governmentality and professionalization – are but five of the social regularities that comprise the dominant liberal social order, that constitute that which becomes visible and acceptable within that order. They operate like a grid that generates what may be seen and talked about, while occluding grid-incongruent alternative possibilities. Other societies or this society at other times might have or have had different regularities. In fact, some of the ones I have named – race (white supremacy) and gender (male supremacy) – are very old, whereas professionalization has arisen primarily in the past 100 years. But, as was pointed out earlier, these are not the only social regularities operant in the contemporary world. I have discussed these five because I think they have particular relevance for the school failure of children (the problem group) and the policy of school-linked services. The regularities of race, class and gender are especially important to the social construction of the problem group (predominantly lower class children, children of colour and children from female head-of-household families), and the regularities of governmentality and professionalization are critical to the naming, describing and treating of the problem and the problem group, though it is the complex interaction of the five regularities that constitutes the problem, the problem group and the policy solution.

*Policy archaeology applied: Arena I*

The target or 'problem' population of the school-linked services policy is largely lower class children (poverty, lack of health care, homelessness), children of single-parent families (which is, of course, gender related), and children of colour (Adler 1993, Capper and Hammler 1993, Crowson and Boyd 1993, Dryfoos 1991, Kirst 1992, Koppich 1993, Mawhinney 1993). We have, therefore, a target population that accords well with the social regularities of class, gender and race. This is a population that is not 'succeeding' in school, is not being properly productive within the school setting and, thus, is not properly prepared to be productive consumers/workers. Governmental agents (including policy analysts) point out, describe and label the group (governmentality), and school, health and social welfare professionals are linked together to treat the problem (professionalization).

According to policy archaeology, the grid of social regularities produces or constructs this problem population. Social regularities 'arrange' the 'seeing' of this target group, the seeing of it as a problem group. This targeting, naming, labelling is the reproductive work of the grid of regularities; the grid both attunes its listeners to hear (see) a particular frequency (the problem group) and constitutes the frequency (the problem group) itself. The grid, thus, is both epistemological and ontological; it constitutes both who the problem group is and how the group is seen or known as a problem.

Social problems, like the failure in school of poor children of colour, are, then, not aberrations but a necessary facet of the dominant social order, the grid of all social regularities operant in any particular period. The social order produces in complex ways both the failure in school of single-parent, poor children of colour and the identification of this group as a problem group. The labelling of the targeted group as a social problem is critical to the maintenance of the social order. The labelling of problem groups via social agents, particularly by socially legitimated social agents such as professionals and policy analysts, positively disciplines productive citizens by defining what a proper productive citizen is and by reaffirming the productive citizens' goodness or correctness. More simplistically, the social order and its attendant regularities reproduces by repeatedly producing 'bad' groups who are publicly identified as such (labelled, studied, treated) so that the productive behaviour of 'good' citizens is repeatedly reinforced.

Another way to approach this is to see that other possible problem groups do not become socially visible as a problem group. For example, it could reasonably be argued that overwhelmingly white suburban schools (substantially born of white flight from people of colour) are training grounds for white supremacy, not in the South African or Fascist sense, but in the sense that the social order privileges whites and that suburban schools inscribe the white supremacy regularity within the subjectivity of their white students. Through such schools the social order is constituting its privileged members - how to behave and how to think. But the social order will not constitute this privileged group as a problem group. The social order will not construct this white suburban student group as a problem group; it will not label, describe, study and treat this group as a problem. It would be at odds with the regularity of white supremacy to identify this white group as a problem.

While race, gender and class regularities are key to the social construction of the problem group, governmentality plays a critical role in the public identification of the group. The describing, numbering and naming processes of governmentality (which includes policy processes) provide a description of the problem group that can be circulated infinitely in both academic media and the public media. As newspapers and television

programmes repeatedly display (make socially visible) this problem group, and academics, including policy analysts, legitimize the group's designation as a problem through journal articles, books and conferences dedicated to this problem (as the 1993 University Council on Educational Administration's - UCEA - annual conference was), the problem group is made 'real'. Consequently, the doctors of social diseases, professionals of all sorts including educators, social workers, health workers and psychologists, are called forth to treat the problem group with the chosen policy intervention. These professionals then use their 'knowledge' (knowledge that is congruent with and reproductive of the social order) to adjust or transform the social group. That fundamental social problems, such as poverty or homelessness or racial prejudice, are never really 'solved' is generally not taken as a negative judgement on professionals or on professionalization. The public performance of the treatment of the problem group by the professionals, even it fails, as it typically does, satisfies society that it is doing its best.

This discussion of the first arena of policy archaeology, the social construction of the problem, is, of course, inadequate. The full archaeology of the naming of the problem and the problem group needs extensive additional work. For example, four additional issues need to be addressed. One of these is why this problem-solution axis has emerged and been accepted so rapidly and widely (Crowson and Boyd 1993).<sup>15</sup> Another is what the involvement of the Danforth Foundation has been in the production of this problem as a problem. A third question is: why do policy analysts report few conversations or research interviews with the target population itself; why is all of the policy commentary so curiously distant? A fourth question is: why do descriptions of the target population form such a small part of policy discussions of this particular problem-policy axis? These, however, are but a few of the incitements that a more comprehensive application of the second arena of policy archaeology to this axis would address. I now turn, then, to a brief application of the third arena of policy archaeology, the study of policy choices.

*Policy archaeology applied: Arena III*

As the grid of social regularities constitutes the problem (and the problem group) and its identification through various public performances both popular and academic, it also constrains the choice of policy 'solutions' or treatments. Because of the 'before conscious thinking' preconceptual frame produced by the grid of social regularities and embodied throughout the social order, certain solutions (and not others) are seeable and knowable by social agents. Policy solutions that are radically at variance with the grid of regularities are not seeable or credible, especially solutions that question or undermine the order itself, like ones that would treat white racism as an important cause of the school failure of poor, urban, single-parent children of colour. Only policy solutions that accord with that order will emerge as salient, probable possibilities.

The policy of 'linked school services', for example, is so obviously a creature of the grid of regularities that it is almost a caricature. On one hand, policy analysts argue that the problem group is very large - 20% of all US children live in poverty; 32% of African-American children (in California) live in poverty; 34% of Hispanic children live in poverty; half of the single women with children live in poverty (Kirst 1992). On the other hand, descriptions of the problem group in scholarly policy commentary occupy a very small percentage of the printed space of their chapters and articles. For example, Koppich's comprehensive article (1993) in the special Politics of Education Association (PEA) edition of this journal spends slightly over one page of 11 on the description of the

problem (pp. 52–53). In fact, the edition has no comprehensive discussion of the problem or the problem group; the problem is simply assumed to be 'known'. It is only the solution that requires extended discussion. The 'true' nature of the problem and the problem group is of such little consequence in the analysts' policy commentary that the 'performance' nature of that work is highlighted. The minimal space in policy commentary that is devoted to a discussion of the nature of the problem and the problem group is almost a direct signal or code that the function of the policy work has little to do with really addressing the problem.

Another way that this policy solution is almost a caricature is that, on one hand, the analysts say that this large, terrible problem exists, but, on the other hand, the solution that has spread so quickly, that has garnered so much policy discussion, that has dominated such prestigious organizations as PEA and UCEA, is simply the linking or coordinating of services that already exist. Does it not seem highly questionable that a large, terrible social problem affecting one-fifth of the nation's children and one-third or more of particular groups of children requires something as simple as linking existing governmental and professional arrangements? It is like the emperor with no clothes. Who could really believe, after reflecting on it, that such a formidable problem is solvable by merely adding a few extra linkages among current social arrangements? If present social, health and schooling services have to date not been able significantly to 'solve' this large social problem, it is difficult to believe that linking them together would seriously impact a problem as sizeable as this one. Surely, if the problem is so large, it would call for a major restructuring of social, health and schooling services or, even, some questions about the social order itself. The 'smallness' of the policy solution in relation to the 'largeness' of the problem, again, highlights the 'performance' nature of this policy solution.

Policy archaeology, however, does not suggest that other policies besides linking services will not be considered by policy analysts, but it does suggest that the range of policy choices will accord with the grid of regularities. In fact, there are many policies already present in the schools and in other settings that address this same problem and problem group, i.e. at-risk student programmes, drop-out prevention programmes, etc. These efforts, however, do accord with the grid of regularities. For example, the very label 'at-risk' tends to blame the students, their parents and their cultures or, more rarely, the school, the teachers and the administrators, but even blaming the latter three, which some critical theorists do, leaves invisible the workings of the implicate social order. Policy solutions which contradict or question that order do not emerge or, when they do emerge among the socially marginalized, do not achieve any credibility among the governmental and policy agents who serve as the legitimacy gatekeepers of the policy discourse. Consequently, that which can be construed as an appropriate policy solution is severely constrained by the social order and its complex workings through its constitution of the subjectivities, epistemologies and ontologies of its members. Because, however, policy archaeology identifies the social regularities that create that order, it can critically highlight the constrained social construction of possible policy solutions. Why conventional and postpositivist policy studies cannot produce a similar analysis will be discussed in the next section.

#### *Policy archaeology applied: Arena IV*

Arena IV is the study of the social functions of policy studies themselves. Policy studies as a problematic, like education and social problems and policy solutions, is itself constituted

by the grid of social regularities. Policy studies is but one governmental apparatus that produces grid-congruent problems, problem groups and policy solutions. Policy analysts count, label and describe problems and problem groups; they are, thus, key in the construction of such problems and groups; and, because of their 'expertise', they legitimize these constructions. In addition, their discussions and debates about possible policy solutions are similarly key to constraining the range of possible policy choices. As Frazer (1989) said:

... the functioning... [social regularities, in this case] essentially involves forms of social constraint. Such constraints and the manner of their application vary... Typically, however, they include such phenomena as the valorization of some statement forms and the concomitant devaluation of others; the institutional licensing of some persons [e.g. policy analysts] as authorized to offer authoritative knowledge claims and the concomitant exclusion of others; procedures for the extraction of information from and about [counting, describing, labelling] persons [problem groups] involving various forms of coercion; and the proliferation of discourse oriented to the objects of inquiry that are, at the same time, targets for the application of social policy. (p. 20; see also White 1991 for a similar discussion)

Postpositivist policy analysts, in general, think they see policy somewhat differently than conventional policy analysts, but they, too, do not question the social order. They even understand the performance nature of policy making and policy studies, but they suggest that the function of the performance is to bring into the public arena 'latent public concerns' (Kelly and Maynard-Moody 1993: 135). I would suggest they even imply that maintenance of the social order is a central function of such public performances, but they do not question that order, and they certainly do not suggest the order itself might be the problem. Postpositivist policy analysts are, thus, able to position themselves as epistemologically superior to conventional policy analysts, while they remain comfortably in accord with the social order. This reminds me of the changes in definitions of property, which Harris (1993) discussed, that leaves the 'core characteristics' intact. Postpositivist policy analysts can argue, as Kelly and Maynard-Moody (1993) do, that they have left the conventional (positivist) orientation behind, but they cannot argue, in my view, that they are functioning any differently, *vis-à-vis* the social order, than conventional policy analysts. They have, thus, retained the 'core characteristics' of the network of social regularities. Both postpositivist policy analysts and conventional policy analysts make the problem and the problem group visible through sanctioned performances, and they both discuss only those policy solutions which sanction that order. The emergence, then, of postpositivist policy analysts can, therefore, be seen as but another production of the grid of social regularities.

Both conventional and postpositivist policy studies, then, are a key facet of the social construction of problems, problem groups and the narrowly constrained range of policy solutions. More importantly, rather than solving or ameliorating social and education problems, both approaches to policy studies are constituted by the grid of social regularities and reproduce that grid. They are a singularly important way in which problems, problem groups and solutions are made socially visible and in which the narrow range of policy solutions is legitimized. Even when policy analysts repeatedly conclude that a particular policy has not worked, as they often do, this judgement rarely leads to a larger critique of policy studies themselves or of the social order itself.

However, making problem groups visible and legitimizing the acceptable range of policy solutions are not the most important functions that policy analysts perform. The most important social function of policy analyses is the normalizing or disciplining of the population. Problems and problem groups are social constructions. The primary function of these constructions is not for the purpose of solving the problems or disciplining and normalizing the problem groups. Instead, the primary function of these social



constructions is to provide a definition of correct, productive behaviour to citizens who are already acting in concert with the social order. As public definitions and discussions of insanity teach and re-teach the sane what insanity is, public definitions and discussions of social and education problems and problem groups teach and re-teach the rest of the citizenry to remain in concert with the grid of social regularities. Socialization to a social order, then, is constantly repeated in social life. That such performances are conducted on the bodies, minds and souls of the most vulnerable groups within society (such as one-fifth of all children and one-third of African-American and Hispanic-American children) is but one aspect of the violence of these productive processes within the highly inequitable US social order. These vulnerable groups are simply a medium through which the larger population is continually re-normalized to be in accord with the social order. Therefore, the primary function of policy studies is not, as is typically assumed, the solution of social problems (the conventional approach) or the symbolic performance of 'latent concerns'; it is the disciplining and normalizing of productive citizens.

In the case of linked school, health and social services, policy analysts are an integral part of the public presentation of the problem and the problem group. Simultaneously, because of their role as experts, they legitimize that presentation and exclude others that do not accord with the dominant social order. Policy studies, thus, are a social performance (as the postpositivists would agree) that reassures the citizenry and affirms the commitment to 'do something' about social and education problems, even though such 'doing' typically has little effect on the more substantive social and education problems. However, the primary function of such social performances is the disciplining and normalizing of productive students: the performances repeatedly show students and their parents what unproductivity looks like, what being a 'bad' student looks like. Possible policy performances that would stage suburban white schools and their white students as 'bad' are simply not 'visible' to policy analysts and, thus, to the public. Consequently, policy studies as an area of scholarly work is not a scientific or 'neutral' enterprise that attempts to bring to public visibility and 'understanding' social and education problems; policy studies is itself a production of the grid of social regularities, and it carries out critically important reproductive work of that order.

### Conclusion

I fear, by this point, that, rather than having established a new policy studies methodology, I have primarily alienated policy analysts and drawn a forbidding characterization of a monstrosity called the grid of social regularities whose anonymous activity imperviously subsumes individual agency. That, however, has not been my intent. While we seem to have great difficulty questioning free will and agency in our own present, we have little difficulty recognizing that members of societies long past operated in accord with the social orders of their times. For example, Romans during the height of the Roman Empire, no matter what their station in life, acted and thought in a manner congruent with that social order and with, I would say, the network of social regularities that comprised that dominant order. Why, then, refuse a similar reflectivity about ourselves within our social order? Surely we are no less constituted by our moment than they were by theirs?

But even if this reflectivity is accepted, my characterization could seem monstrously impersonal, as if our lives are being conducted through us and not by us. Consider, however, the problematic of policy studies. Policy analysts readily admit that the USA has

large, serious social and education problems, the experience of which leads to desperate lives for a large proportion of our children. Indeed, many of our citizens, especially children, live in horrendously destructive conditions. This, however, is not new; it is not a predicament that has only emerged in the last five or ten years; it has been with us, to a greater or lesser degree, for at least 100 years, if not longer. This historical period also encompasses the emergence of the social sciences, among whose originating goals was the use of science to improve social life, and the related emergence of the professions that were to utilize the knowledge developed by those sciences. This period also encompasses the explosive growth of public media that have brought the wide disparities of social life into everyone's living room. Why, then, have the social sciences, including the policy sciences, and the professions failed so disastrously? Why do those who are not experiencing desperate lives so readily ignore those who are, even when that desperation can be seen daily on television? As Henry Louis Gates has said, 'That nearly half of African-American children live in poverty is one scandal; another is simply that this fact has become an acceptable feature of our social landscape, as unremarkable as crab grass' (p. A16). Why are the most vulnerable groups seen as a social problem and the most powerful groups not seen as a problem within dominant public and academic discourses? What has brought us to this circumstance? What is it about our society that has produced this monstrous result?

I find inadequate the answers to these questions that rely on the individual political and moral agency of supposedly self-aware and free-choosing subjects of liberal and critical thought. Although it flies in the face of popular conceptions of free will and moral agency, conceptions which are constituted by and reproduce the liberal social order, it makes little sense to me to say that people simply do not care or that they are consciously racist or sexist or classist. If our society is one or all of these, how does it work? How is male supremacy reproduced? How is white supremacy reproduced? How can white supremacy fade as a conscious orientation among whites while so many African-Americans continue to experience US society as a white supremacist one?

Answers to these questions that are based on structuralist assumptions, like those of Marx or critical theorists, I also find flawed in ways that I have argued throughout this paper. Based on my intersection with Foucaultian poststructuralism, I have tried to develop a new methodological frame for policy studies, a frame which I have called policy archaeology, which provides a different approach to the questions I have raised in this conclusion. Through the problematic of policy studies I have tried to develop a different way of thinking about ourselves, our social and education problems, our efforts to solve them, and a different way of thinking about policy studies as one possible medium for this new thinking. In addition, I have tried to explore briefly how this methodology might be applied to one problem-policy axis. I am aware, however, that policy archaeology and its attendant assumptions are complex and sometimes ambiguous; I am similarly aware that I have left loose ends and confusing contradictions. I think policy archaeology Arenas I, III, and IV are fairly clear, but Arena II, the grid of social regularities and the one the other three arenas are so dependent upon, is based on complex, difficult concepts. The concept of 'social regularities' is a somewhat mobile metaphor that requires more scrutiny and thought. None the less, I think I have initiated a new policy studies problematic. Whether my effort will incite critique or utilization of the problematic I do not know. I hope that it will provoke both.

## Notes

1. I also should point out that my understanding and interpretation of Foucault has been particularly influenced by Frazer (1989), though I disagree with some of her criticisms. For example, Frazer, like other critical theorists and feminists, privileges individual agency more than Foucault does or more than I do, as will become apparent as the reader proceeds through this article.
2. Social problems and education problems typically can only be artificially separated; for the most part I do not attempt such separation. For example, the violence being experienced in US schools is not separable from the violence being experienced throughout US society. Furthermore, policy archaeology as a policy studies methodology is equally applicable whether the focus is social or education problems and policies.
3. I do not here discuss the differences and similarities between policy archaeology and critical theoretical approaches, although many of these differences and similarities will be apparent as this article proceeds. For example, most critical approaches give centre stage to the conscious actions of social agents, whereas my Foucaultian poststructuralism has little focus on this. For example, Simon (1989), who uses a critical approach, has said, 'What actually happens [to improve a particular situation] depends on *human* [emphasis in original] action' (p. 40). Still, my debt to critical theory should be abundantly obvious throughout this article. (For other examples of critical approaches to policy issues, see, for example, Ball 1990, Dale 1989, and Wallace 1993. For one example of a discussion of neo-Marxist views of agency in relation to Foucault's views of agency, see Gordon 1991.)
4. Occasionally I use quotes from Foucault in which I make substitutions in brackets which apply Foucault's statements to my subjects. For example, in the statement just cited I have substituted 'social regularities', my concept, for Foucault's concept, 'pre-existing forms of continuity'. This substitution obviously changes the particular meaning of Foucault's statement, but I do not, however, think I change the more general meaning as it might be applied to my topic.
5. When I say that 'social problems are social constructions', I do not mean to imply that social problems do not exist or exist only in the perceptions of human agents. What I mean is that how social problems are named, defined and discussed is a social process and that the social visibility of some 'problems' as social problems and the invisibility of other 'problems' as social problems, all of which will be discussed later in the article, is also part of this process of social construction. However, the issue of what is 'real' (social problems or whatever) is not as simple as common-sense realism would have it; this issue is epistemologically an exceedingly complex one.
6. Although Mahon (1992) suggests, as others have, that Foucault drops archaeology in favour of genealogy because he found archaeology to be inadequate, I found Mahon's work to be particularly provocative for my own thinking about this article. I would, thus, recommend it not as some excellent interpretation of Foucault, though it may be that, but as a valuable incitement or a provocation.
7. I repeatedly use the word 'positive' in relation to the constitutive or productive/reproductive nature of social regularities. I have taken this from Foucault. He used the word 'positive' in relation to power to mean that the micro-circulations of power were generative rather than constraining or controlling as the effects of power are commonly thought to be. Similarly, I mean that the constituting of social regularities is generative. For a good discussion of Foucault's view of power, see Frazer (1989).
8. For other discussions of this issue, see Foucault (1973: xiv or xxiii, or 1991: 58-59). See also White (1978).
9. Hoy (1986) called this process 'subliminal socialization' (p. 15), which produced what Margolis (1993) has called 'a habit of mind' (p. 45).
10. One issue I do not discuss in this paper, though it is certainly an important one, is that the grid of social regularities constitutes policy archaeology as a policy studies methodology just as this grid constitutes social problems, policy solutions, and conventional and interpretivist policy studies orientations. I hope to be able to discuss this in some future piece.
11. Poststructuralists such as Derrida and Foucault have held that it is impossible simply to move outside a particular regime of truth within a society. They argue that one can never entirely escape such regimes. There is inevitably, then, much structuralism in my 'poststructuralism', just as there is much structuralism in Foucault's works; such structuralism is currently inescapable. For example, Margolis (1993) says that, according to Foucault, 'we cannot abandon [the order within which we live], even where we would attack it' (p. 58).
12. By this point some readers may have concluded that I think the social order is some totalized, determinative monster within which only unity and congruence exist, what Frazer (1989) calls 'a single, monolithic "symbolic order"' (p. 10). Although I have certainly emphasized the importance of

the social order (the grid of social regularities taken as a whole), I do not see the social order as such a totalization. Social orders are historically shifting, complex, dispersed systems comprising unities and differences, continuities and discontinuities. But, since there are always, in complex systems, potential and incipient but marginalized and suppressed alternatives, there is a grid or network of social regularities which produces and reproduces a dominant order. One of the reasons that this order must perpetually re-engage, re-train, re-normalize and re-discipline its productive members is that difference is a constant turbulence, an impending threat to that order.

13. There seems to be a general, informal sanction against the labels 'white supremacy' or 'white racism'. Although there are some exceptions (e.g. Scheurich 1993, or Rains 1994), most of the public and academic discourse on racial differentiation, discrimination and inequity uses the term 'racism'. I would argue, however, that this informal sanction is but one example of the productive work of white supremacy as a regularity. In other words, the reluctance to use this particular label is a typical example of the effects of a social regularity. On the one hand, even I am reluctant to use this label because I know that many white readers I want to reach may close their minds, albeit unconsciously, to the issues I raise. On the other hand, I think it is dishonest not to use 'white supremacy' as the better descriptor.
14. 'Productive' is a code for congruence with the larger social order. Productive citizens play a positive role - do not break rules, are not disobedient, go to work on time, are not disruptive - on a daily basis. Being a productive citizen means one is aligned 'in thought and deed' with the social order. Being unproductive calls forth various disciplinary apparatuses within schools, government and private enterprise, though the true focus of such disciplinary practices is the continued normalization of the productive citizens and not so much the disciplining of the unproductive. Of course, no system is capable of totalization. Few individuals are completely congruent with the social order, and the system is sufficiently large, complex and loose to absorb with little disruption minor incongruities.
15. For examples of the spread and acceptance of this problem-policy axis at different levels of governmental activity, see *Together We Can: A Guide for Crafting a Profamily System of Education and Human Services*, which was produced by the US Department of Education and the US Department of Health and Human Services (1993), and *Forces of Change: Shaping the Future of Texas*, produced by John Sharp (1994), the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts.

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## New education in new times

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This paper is concerned with 'new times', new policies for education in Australia and the new issues that they generate for education. More particularly, the paper's focus is upon the various educational forms that have emerged now that governments have let the market 'genie' out of the bottle. It identifies particularly those market forms to which information and communication technologies are integral and a range of ways in which education, markets and such technologies are coming together. In so doing, it offers a general sociological framework within which to understand these developments and a specific conceptual framework to assist in categorising such new educational forms.

### Introduction

As the title implies, this paper is concerned with the new: with the new times we are going through; the new education policies and new and pseudo-new education forms that both reflect and help to effect such times; and with the new issues for education that arise as a result of the new. We will begin with a brief overview of the current education policies that are seeking to effect 'new' education and will point to one particular consequence of such policies. We will then briefly identify some of the key features of 'new times' and some of the debates about this concept. The rest of the paper will focus on the new educational forms which have emerged as a result of the heady mix of new policies and new times. It will identify their key features, put them into historical context, and identify a framework which helps to conceptualize the structural shifts which these new forms represent. We will conclude by raising a number of issues about new education in new times.

The research project from which this paper arises is called 'Marketing Education in the Information Age'. The project began in 1992, during which time we: identified the many ways in which Australian education is assuming a market identity; examined the different national and international literatures in education that have promoted the marketization process; explored the different ways in which this marketization process has been conceptualized and explained; examined the arguments of those who have been critical about marketing education and identified the political, education and ethical grounds on which such critiques have been developed; and identified and critically examined the empirical research and theorizing which has been conducted in Australia, the UK, New Zealand, the USA and Canada (Kenway 1993b).

All of this was, in a sense, background work for current documentary, empirical and theoretical work being conducted on a number of case and cameo studies of different examples of market forms in education. The focus is particularly on those education markets within which information technology plays a role and it is our contention that